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The first Workshop of the series “Legal Forum on Utilities Regulation” 
organised by the Florence School of Regulation gathered 34 
participants from 11 European countries. The Workshop was devoted 
to describe and discuss the judicial review of regulatory decisions 
adopted mainly in the energy sector, with a comparative approach. 
Participants to the workshop were mostly legal experts from National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), Courts of the Member States, the 
European Commission and from academic institutions.   
 
Issues for comparison and discussion 
 
The decentralisation of antitrust authorities in the European Union has 
been accompanied with some ‘harmonisation’ of the rules of antitrust 
enforcement (although much remains to national procedural 
autonomy) while energy regulation does not reach even that limited 
degree of European harmonisation. However, a comparative analysis 
of judicial review in the sphere of energy regulation in Europe is 
appropriate for at least two reasons. Firstly, the third energy package 
of September 2007 proposes the establishment of an Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and a minimum set of rules 
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on administrative and judicial review by the European Courts of the 
decisions adopted by the ACER. Secondly, a comparative analysis on 
judicial review in this field is complementary to the comparative 
analysis of energy markets and energy regulation, and it responds to 
the need to share information on these issues among Member States. 
 
In the regulation of energy markets, the courts often play a primary 
role because they have the final word on very delicate issues that 
affect both firms and consumers. The Workshop provided an 
opportunity to outline an initial sketch of the current judicial review 
methods on energy regulation. Key issues for comparison and 
discussion were: 
a. the unavoidability of judicial review,  
b. the scope of the review,  
c. its procedure,  
d. the locus standi (right to bring an action),  
e. interim measures,  
f. the execution of the judgment and assessment of damages.  
 
National divergences on judicial review 
 
In Italy, administrative courts enjoy exclusive jurisdiction to review 
every decision adopted by the Regulatory Authority for Electricity and 
Gas. The competent court of first instance is the Tribunale 
Amministrativo Regionale (TAR) located in Milan, where the energy 
regulator is based. The competent court of second instance is the 
Consiglio di Stato, in Rome. In both cases some specialisation in the 
energy field has been developed in one section of the Court, but there 
are no technicians. The nature of the judicial review is concerned with 
the legitimacy of the administrative decisions (violation of law, 
incompetence, misuse of power), and not to their merit. Against the 
judgment of second instance, an appeal is possible before the Corte di 
Cassazione only to contest the jurisdiction. An appeal is also available 
before the President of the Italian Republic for some cases. 
 
In the Netherlands, the Dutch Office on Energy Regulation comes 
under the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and operates as a chamber 
within the Netherlands Competition Authority. This is supposed to 
promote consistency between the enforcement of energy regulation 
and competition law. Unlawful administrative action may be reviewed 
by administrative courts. The standard procedure for judiciary review 
in case of regulated industries consists, in principle, of 3 phases: (1) 
pre-proceeding at administrative level, in which the order is to be 
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reconsidered by the regulatory body; (2) an appeal to the District 
Court in Rotterdam, a specialised section for regulated industries; (3) 
court proceedings before judges specialised in handling cases 
regarding regulated industries and competition law. On the other 
hand, a distinction is to be made between a full review and a marginal 
review. A review on the basis of a statutory law is a full review. In 
other cases, the courts tend to refrain from a full review, mostly 
because the economics of the case are technically complicated. The 
criteria, besides statutory law, for review are: due process, fairness, 
proportionality, non-discrimination, reasonableness etc. Finally, 
judiciary decisions may be appealed before a court of last resort. In 
conclusion, the main peculiarities of the Dutch system are: the 
presence of one authority acting both as a competition commission 
and as a regulator; the role played by the associations of consumers, 
who operate as a filter for bringing to the courts issues of general 
interest; the use of a civil agreement between the authority and the 
regulated firms as a substitute to an administrative decision. 
 
In Spain, regulatory decisions are taken by the Regulatory 
Commission for Energy (CNE) whose independence with respect to 
Government has been questioned. In general, all the regulatory 
decisions may be appealed before the Ministry of Industry and Energy, 
and this remedy is obligatory in order to appeal to judiciary 
authorities. However, the resolutions of CNE that decide disputes on 
the economic and technical management of the system are exempt 
from this remedy: they end the administrative procedure and open the 
door to the judicial review. The competent jurisdiction is the 
Contentious-Administrative Division of the National High Court (whose 
decisions may only be appealed before the Constitutional Court for 
violation of fundamental rights). The magistrates are specialists in 
administrative law, and although they do not need a specialisation in 
the regulation sector for their appointment, they are usually 
competent in this field because of their experience and previous 
dedication to the matter. The scope of the judicial action concerns 
formal defects in the administrative procedure, substantive rights and 
the proportionality of the act.  
 
In Germany, the BundesNetzAgentur (BNetzA) regulates postal 
services, telecommunications and railways and has taken up 
competence on electricity and gas only in July 2005. Competences are 
split between BNetzA and Regional Regulatory Authorities. Legal action 
taken against BNetzA’s decisions falls within the jurisdiction of a 
special cartel divisions of the civil courts; this is an exception from the 
general rule, according to which administrative courts decide over 
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public law matters, with an aim to guarantee a uniform application and 
interpretation of the law.  Since 2005 more than 900 court 
proceedings have been initiated. The competent court to deal with 
BNetzA’s decisions is the Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf. It 
examines both facts and legality and a special procedure applies, 
similar to administrative court proceedings. The court shall inquire into 
the facts ex-officio, and it proceeds to a strong review of the 
regulator’s decision. An appeal on the legality of the decision is 
possible before the Federal Court of Justice, which is bound to the 
findings of the facts. 
 
In Austria the regulatory function is shared between Energy Control 
Ltd (E-Control, a state-owned company) and the Energy Control 
Commission. The latter is also the appeal body against decisions of the 
former. The successive competence for judicial review is held by civil 
courts, which apply the civil procedure act implying some limitations 
such as the prohibition of introduction of new evidence. After 
exhaustion of all stages of appeal, an action is possible before the 
administrative and Constitutional courts. It is to be noted that the civil 
courts often lack technical expertise. Half the judgments of the civil 
courts deviate from the decisions adopted by the regulator. Another 
drawback is linked with the decentralisation of regulatory decisions, 
increasing legal uncertainty. There are reform plans for the creation of 
specialised chambers in the administrative court as a second instance, 
while the E-Control Commission would be the first instance. 
 
In Norway the energy regulator is the Norwegian Water Resources 
and Energy Directorate (NVE). Appeals shall be first sent through NVE 
for its own review, then to the Ministry as the immediate superior 
administrative agency. The appeal instance is competent to make a full 
review. The appeal process is free of charge and a party may be 
awarded to pay only the necessary costs to get the decision altered. 
The review by the judiciary is done by ordinary courts and is based on 
errors of facts, procedure and law; since the plaintiff runs the risk of 
paying the costs of the case, it is not common in Norway to use the 
ordinary courts to review decisions. Complaints against the regulator’s 
decisions may also be lodged before the Ombudsman, which is 
competent to investigate and evaluate injustice, maladministration and 
human rights violations by the public authorities; the Ombudsman 
may pass an opinion, but not take legally binding decisions, yet its 
opinions are widely respected and public agencies usually comply with 
them. 
 
 5 
In the United Kingdom  the Competition Commission (CC) is the 
appeal body against decisions adopted by Ofgem, the energy regulator 
and by other network industries regulators, besides having direct 
competence on competition cases: it has a double role. The review is 
on merits, substantive and the CC may re-open the case. One 
important case that should be mentioned is the regulator’s decision on 
charging mechanisms for taking gas out of the network. This decision 
was taken following a three years discussion, as well as a cost benefit 
analysis. The decision was challenged on every conceivable ground by 
E.ON. The tightrope was to decide whether the decision was wrong, 
without deciding which was the right one. The appeal was allowed in 
part (subsequently not all costs were awarded for payment by the 
regulator) and the decision quashed. The regulator is still considering 
the ‘right’ answer. On the other hand, the Competition Appeals 
Tribunal (CAT) is the appeal body for decisions adopted by the Office 
of Fair Trade, the Competition Commission and the telecoms regulator. 
The CAT is primarily judicial, not economic, and it is chaired by a 
judge. When the challenged decision is very technical, there is a 
referral back from CAT to CC.  
 
Judicial review from a common regulatory 
perspective 
 
Judicial review is necessary and inevitable. The difficulty to compare in 
a systematic way the system of judicial review in different countries 
was recognised. To understand better each of them, it would be 
necessary to take a hypothetical case and see how it would be dealt by 
the judiciary system of each country. One issue is whether it is 
realistic to expect some harmonisation on judicial review without 
further harmonisation of powers and competences of national 
regulators. Since the procedures for judicial review are set at national 
level according to the subsidiarity principle, harmonisation is to be 
considered mostly at the level of principles: proportionality, non-
discrimination, reasonableness, rule of law, non arbitrary decision. 
Judicial review in the energy field raises some common concerns in 
countries where independent regulatory authorities have been set up 
in the wake of liberalisation. For instance, administrative remedies 
prior to access to the judiciary can be seen as a political influence 
contrary to the regulator’s independence. Different countries have 
tackled the same problem in different ways: when the law to 
implement the European directives was discussed in Spain, the energy 
regulator asked for the removal of the appeal to the Ministry; in Italy 
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there is a case pending concerning the appeal before the President of 
the Republic with constitutional implications. Moreover, the 
administrative remedies may delay the judicial proceedings 
unnecessarily. It was argued that all national regulators should have 
the power to challenge the Ministry’s decisions on energy matters. The 
hierarchy of laws should be homogenous at the EC level in order to 
have some legal certainty. 
 
The National Regulatory Authorities are independent both from the 
political and from the economic power. Its administrative procedures 
and its administrative decisions need to be controlled only by courts 
through judicial review. While the degree of control over the regulators 
by the judiciary leads to distinction between ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ review, 
it is commonly established that courts cannot modify or replace 
administrative decisions. On the contrary, courts can declare the 
illegitimacy of the flawed decision and set its annulment. Then, the 
NRA concerned has to adopt a new decision that complies with the 
judgment.  
 
An important difference among countries is the existence of specialised 
courts in some countries. In the Netherlands, there are generally 
positive comments with regard to the creation of a specialised branch 
of the judiciary. In Austria, there are plans to create a specialised 
chamber in the Federal Administrative Court as second instance. On 
the other hand, in other countries like Spain, magistrates become 
experts on regulatory matters through experience. In any case, NRAs 
should not be considered as a counterpart of the judge, but rather as a 
public authority that assists the judge in a common interest, that is, 
better regulation. In that regard, specialisation of the judiciary might 
not be the appropriate expression; judges should be rather well 
informed.  
 
The discussion also raised the locus standi issue, which is dealt quite 
similarly in all countries. The right to bring an action belongs to those 
parties whose interest is directed affected by an order: the 
addressees. Third parties must prove an individual and direct interest: 
for instance, competitors and consumer organisations. However, 
individual consumers are not entitled to challenge the regulator’s 
decisions, because this would open the door to an unlimited number of 
complaints. On the other hand, consumers have the right to challenge 
their specific contract with the energy company before ordinary courts. 
 
The economists did not miss to underline the merit of a cost-benefit 
analysis of judicial review. In the early times of liberalisation, there 
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were many claims related to the perception and calculation of tariffs, 
where there is a lot to be gained; but this is changing with the 
elimination of tariffs for final consumers. Moreover, when the 
administrative procedure that led to the challenged decision was 
submitted to broad consultation and gathered a wide consensus, there 
will be little to be gained in appealing it. In countries where fees for 
the lawyers are extremely high, it might not be worth going to court.  
 
Other cost-benefit elements might be the impact of the judicial action 
on the share price of the energy company when its shares are traded 
in stock exchanges. Finally, the company management might prefer 
not to go through tedious judicial proceedings since it could affect the 
smoothly daily running. 
 
In conclusion, the Workshop showed the need for better understanding 
of the different judicial systems in the European countries. All 
countries might benefit from understanding which arrangements have 
proved most satisfactory, regardless of the fact that they have a long 
experience in regulatory institutions like the UK, or a recent one like 
Germany. An increased amount of information and analysis is needed 
in order to avoid the mistakes of the others. In this respect, a major 
involvement of the European Commission might be needed. The idea 
would not be to attain convergence, but to set up error-correction 
mechanisms.  
 
Finally, the Workshop has confirmed the usefulness of the “Legal 
Forum” initiative and the interest of participants in further meetings. 
